SL: ECONOMIC MISERIES AND POLITICAL REPRESSION!

A Long War and New Repressions.............................Tisaranee Gunasekara

"What we see is the picture of a government, both terribly nervous and whose arrogance far overreaches its wisdom".

UTHR (Pawns of an Unheroic War – Special Report No. 31 – 27.10.2008)


Vellupillai Pirapaharan is not prone to making public pronouncements; when he does so, it is sensible to pay attention. In a recent email interview with the Indian magazine ‘Nakkeeran’ the Tiger leader dismissed President Rajapakse’s intention of taking Killinochchi as a ‘day dream’ and indicated that the LTTE would never settle for anything less than Eelam. These two statements not only demonstrate the fanaticism and the maximalism of the Tiger; they also remind us that the war will not end in the foreseeable future and a negotiated settlement with the LTTE is impossible as long as Mr. Pirapaharan is alive.

The LTTE is weak; however its military and psychological capacity to resist remains, as the air raids on the Army Headquarters in Mannar and the Kelanitissa power station demonstrated, yet again. The Tigers will fight for Killinochchi (and for Wanni) with all their might, and, given their fanatical commitment to their cause and their leader, their resistance is likely to be long and hard. True, the continuation of the war is hurting rather than helping the Tamil cause, but this would not deter the LTTE, as it is committed to none but itself and its leader.

Since the hope of a quick end to the war is fading, it is apposite to pay greater attention to the two main non-military factors which would assume increasing importance with time – Tamilnadu and the economy. Basil Rajapakse’s visit to Delhi did not end the Tamilnadu crisis but merely caused a temporary de-escalation. The fate of Lankan Tamils will remain a key issue in Tamilnadu politics, assuming ever greater importance as the war escalates and national and regional elections in India draw near. Mr. Karunanidhi has launched an immensely successful relief fund for ‘Eelam Tamils’. A commercial shutdown is scheduled for October 31st to express "solidarity with Sri Lankan Tamils and to urge the Centre to intervene and ensure a ceasefire is brought in force there" (The Hindu – 29.10.2008). The BJP has declared that "India had the ‘moral right and responsibility’ to intervene in Sri Lankan Tamils issue and should not remain a ‘silent spectator’ to the sufferings of the civilian Tamils in the island" (ibid). Clearly what Mr. Rajapakse has obtained is nothing more than a breathing space; if there are civilian killings in the North and/or if the APRC becomes an exercise in futility (again), the Tamilnadu factor will get reactivated, in a far more dangerous form.

Tamils and Tamilnadu

At long last the President seems to have developed a modicum of understanding of the potency of the Tamilnadu factor, as his unusually conciliatory interview with the Hindu indicates. But is the Presidential change of mind real or ephemeral? When asked whether his four Ds – Demilitarisation, Democratisation, Development, Devolution – are in some order, Mr. Rajapakse answers: "Yes. Without demilitarisation first, you won’t be able to achieve anything. No democratisation, no development, no devolution. It is useless to give them devolution when they are not ready to accept it or you can’t implement it’ (The Hindu – 29.10.2008). Does Mr. Rajapakse believe that a political solution to the ethnic problem (he is careful not to use the term ‘ethnic problem’) should follow rather than precede demilitarisation and devolution? True a political solution, however generous, cannot be implemented on the ground, so long as the Tigers remain a force, as Mr. Pirapaharan’s interview with ‘Nakkeeran’ indicates. But a political solution must be in existence, on paper, in order to create some of the conditions needed for the defeat of the LTTE, especially denting the Tigers’ will to resist, winning over civilian Tamils and neutralising the Tamilandu factor.

The war cannot be brought to a victorious conclusion so long as the LTTE’s ferocious will to fight remains undiminished. And as we have seen in the last weeks, there are plenty of Tigers willing to kill and die for their cause. Their commitment can be undermined only if a doubt is created in their minds about the necessity of the war. And such a doubt is possible only if the Lankan state offers a substantial power sharing deal to the minorities, thereby making the Eelam goal superfluous and the war to achieve it unnecessary. A political solution is also necessary to reconcile Tamilnadu to the Fourth Eelam War and to regain international support. Once such a political solution is in place, the war cannot be depicted as a Sinhala vs. Tamil conflict. And when the war cannot be depicted as a Sinhala attempt to subjugate the Tamils, the politico-psychological conditions necessary to win over Lankan Tamils and isolate the hardcore Tiger supporters in Tamilnadu will fall into place.

By reiterating his maximalist commitment to Eelam, Mr. Pirapaharan has clearly indicated why another appeasement process cannot bring about peace in Sri Lanka. But as long as the war continues sans a political solution, the demand for a negotiated settlement with the LTTE will grow. If the Lankan polity can come up with a reasonable political solution, the onus will be on the LTTE, to accept it or reject it. When the Tigers reject it, they will expose themselves as the only remaining obstacle to a lasting peace. This will give the regime the necessary political space to continue the war to a successful conclusion.

Vellupillai Pirapaharan wants the war to drag on indefinitely. Therefore he needs to win over another generation of Tamils to the idea of a war for Eelam, by making them treat the Lankan state as an enemy out to destroy the Tamil race. Commenting on the Al Qaeda ‘endorsement’ of Senator John McCain for US Presidency, Prof. Joseph Nye, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council said, "from their perspective a continuation of Bush policies is best for recruiting" (New York Times – 25.10.2008). Unfortunately the same seems to be true of the Rajapakse regime which is going out of its way to antagonise the minorities. Is it because, as the UTHR opines "fighting the LTTE has become almost secondary to the prerequisite of the extremists close to the corridors of power to establish a Sinhalese-Buddhist state and erase all semblance of pluralism" (Special Report No. 31)? This is a dangerous gamble - if the Lankan state acts like a Sinhala entity, Tamilnadu will respond as a Tamil power; as Tamilnadu will eventually be backed by Delhi, it is a contestation we cannot but lose.

That the Tigers should act with scant regard for human rights, democracy and civility is axiomatic, given their essential nature. But a different code of conduct is expected from the Lankan forces and their Tamil allies. According to the latest UTHR report there is a clear deterioration in the human rights situation in government controlled areas, because impunity is rampant and any crime can be committed under the guise of anti-Tigerism. Since the UTHR is known for its principled opposition to the LTTE its charges of murder, abduction and rape against the Lankan Forces and their Tamil allies cannot be dismissed as pro-LTTE propaganda. And if these accusations are accurate, the Lankan state is ploughing the ground for Mr. Pirapaharan to harvest the next generation of Tigers. Tolerating human rights abuses against civilian Tamils in the name of national security undermines national security by turning more and more Tamils into enemies of the state. And for many of them, the best path to revenge would be to join the LTTE. Myopic, bigoted anti-Tigerism will thus breed more Tigers and an unending war.

The Economic Stakes

The regime disbelieved in the Tamilnadu factor until it burst out in a fury; similarly the regime seems to think that it can violate every economic rule with impunity, for as long as necessary. The Rajapakses’ incapacity to grasp reality is nowhere more evident than in the economic realm and the Governor of the Central Bank symbolises this fatal incapacity: "Sri Lanka would not feel any negative impact from the global financial crisis, said Governor Ajith Nivad Cabral…. "We have carefully formulated our economy to face crises and today such policies and practices are paying off’ he said" (Daily News – 20.10.2008). Less than 48 hours later the Colombo Tea Auction went into a crisis due to a record drop in tea prices "mainly because of a reduction in demand from Russia and Middle East due to global economic conditions (Reuters – 23.10.2008). A similar crisis is evident vis-à-vis rubber prices. The regime has asked planters to reduce production by tapping rubber trees less and is thinking of providing tea and rubber producers as well as the garment sector with subsidies to offset the drop in demand (the latter due to the expected withdrawal of the GSP+ facility). The regime is also thinking of propping up tea prices artificially by buying large stocks, just as it is propping up the Lankan rupee. According to media reports Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves have dropped while money printing is on the rise. The ingredients for a major economic catastrophe are falling into place.

Wars are expensive. The Fourth Eelam War is particularly so, given the capital intensive strategy of the regime. The war can continue only so long as money can be found for it. Since the gap between real income and real expenditure is growing, the capacity to fund the war would become increasingly dependent on the ability to raise loans in international money markets. And Sri Lanka’s loan-worthiness is likely to be adversely affected by the global financial crisis, weak national economic fundamentals and the LTTE’s latest air raids (which made international headlines). What will happen when the loans dry up? If the Tigers are on their last legs, as the government claims, those last legs seem unusually strong and numerically many. The LTTE is not only resisting the military on two fronts; it is also making a comeback in the East, waging a classic guerrilla war. As events in the last week demonstrated, both the Sea Tigers and the Air Tigers are alive and kicking. That is why the financial sustainability of a long war should be a matter of urgent concern for the regime.

The Rajapakse administration’s legitimacy stems solely from its success on the war front. If the government cannot deliver the expected fast victory, the majority support it currently enjoys will gradually decline. Is the government planning to deal with this problem by hiding the actual condition of the war from the public? Is that why the releasing of casualty figures to the media was discontinued and a new gazette notification giving the regime wide powers to control private television stations was introduced?. Since the war cannot be won soon, is the regime planning to maintain the illusion of a quick victory in order to retain the support of the Sinhala majority?

Curtailing media freedom may be deemed necessary for another reason – the need to prevent the public from discovering how the rulers are living in clover while demanding sacrifices from the masses. According to the Sunday Island of last week, 40 ministers are being granted Rs. 100,000/- each, per month, from public coffers as house rent. The beneficiaries of this largesse include members of the SLFP, LSSP, CP, the UNP rebel group as well as the minority parties. Perhaps the most remarkable amongst them is Minister Champika Ranawaka whose party, the JHU, not long ago exhorted the populace to eat bajiri for the sake of the war. Is it patriotism or knavery to spend Rs. 48 million on 40 ministers annually as house rent while the Army is seeking public contributions to build houses for servicemen? There is nothing like economic misery compounded by the absence of a shared sense of sacrifice to cause a paradigmatic shift in public mood from triumphalism towards peace at any price. Therefore as the war becomes prolonged, the regime will have no choice but to curtail democratic freedoms in the South in order to prevent the ‘exposure’ of reality and consequent public protests. With a long war in the North and new repression in the South, the public are in for bleak times.

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