THERE WERE SO MANY TAMIL BODIES...!!! WE NEVER ACCEPT INTL INQUIRY!!!

I was always confident

Defence Secretary (Ret) Colonel Gotabhaya Rajapaksa RWP, RSP, Psc is the one man credited for co-ordinating the successful 'war effort' against the LTTE. In a wide ranging interview with Chandani Kirinde of The Sunday Times, Col. Rajapaksa says how he was convinced that only a military solution will work; how a troika outside the Foreign Ministry kept India in the loop during the fighting; and dismisses the need for any investigations into the conduct of the 'war'. He is coy about giving details on how exactly the LTTE leadership was eventually killed and says his brother and President Mahinda Rajapaksa is entitled to the political mileage he is receiving from a grateful public for the leadership he gave.
What convinced you that the LTTE could be defeated militarily?

A: I did not say that we must start fighting from the day I was appointed as the Defence Secretary. But I had knowledge of military operations against the LTTE and from the beginning, that whatever it did, especially Prabhakaran, its ultimate goal was to get 'Eelam' through military means because 'Eelam' was not achievable through a political process. The peace process was on (at the time) and I was involved in that too. After that, it was clear to me by the way the LTTE was behaving that this peace process will not go very far.


Defence Secretary (Ret) Colonel Gotabhaya Rajapaksa
It was clear to my mind that the LTTE had to be militarily defeated. I was getting ready with the commanders, planning to get equipment while the political negotiations were being done through the Peace Secretariat. We appointed a new army commander, we had discussions with all the service commanders and we were preparing the military to face whatever military action of the LTTE. It was our duty to be so prepared.

I was confident we could do this if we have a committed team. I knew politically I could convince the President that after the peace process failed, we have to go for the military option and that if we had the correct people, right planning, the required numbers and the weaponry we could achieve our goal. During the 2006/2007 period, it was not an easy thing to do as there was so much opposition and obstacles, even from the media.

Everything was against us but we had a plan and I knew it was workable. I knew there would be no resistance from the government as I was directly dealing with the President. I knew there would be no obstacle from the political side to stop this halfway. We also needed to get the support of the rest of the country. To maintain a campaign like this, public support is very essential. We needed recruits and lot of support from the public.

Was it difficult to shore up public support given the fact people were weary of the war?

A: In the beginning, members of the public, some sections in the government, even some officials must have thought this would be like previous occasions. That we will start with a big bang and end up in the same way. But I am sure as time passed by, they knew we were on the right track. Gradually people were convinced it was heading in the right direction. I think the people began to develop confidence in the way the President, myself and the Commanders handled the situation. It was not an easy task.

There was criticism in the media and even the defence analysts were saying that things are not going right. We did certain things to counter this which were not done previously. On the media side, we established the defence web site to give the public current information on the progress of the war with hourly updates. We also started the “Api wenuwen api” campaign through the media to build support for the military. In that way somehow, very quickly, we were able to win over the public and that helped us to get the recruitment campaign going. That was an important factor because in previous times we had lot of problems getting people to join the military. As the Secretary of Defence, my task is to advise the President on formulation of his defence policy. After the decision is made, implementing it is my duty.

It was fortunate that it was between the Ministry and the President so that for me to brief the President every time, even on an hourly basis or whenever there was a crisis was easy because I had that access because he is my brother. He knew that I will tell him the correct ground situation rather than trying to cover up. Because of my commitment I was always trying to analyze and give the exact picture and brief the President accordingly. My main aim was to do the task given to me and the President knew I had no other agendas. Previously such problems would have been there because a politician, or a minister was doing the role of giving the leadership, so when that happens there are political interests.

Whether it was to increase the military or whether it was to get equipment or to appoint particular persons, it was purely on my recommendation that the President acted. So for him to decide on these things was very easy. I was very committed, focused and similarly I was able to get the commitment and focus of the entire military. We were very lucky we had three commanders who were very committed and the troops knew that the top was committed.

From the time the operations started and upto the end, did you at any point feel that the tide could change in favour of the LTTE?

A: I was confident from the very beginning. In all the interviews I gave from the beginning I was telling the public to believe us, support us and we can do this. That is why I had issues with the media especially because of my commitment to this task. M main focus was to fight the LTTE. I wanted all the support for this purpose. Their (some sections of the media) thinking may have been they are making constructive criticism but I thought it was damaging to our forces.

That is why I did not want any of them to do it because I thought that it would change public opinion and demoralize the troops. To fight, the mindset of the soldier is very important. If they thought certain things were not going right or causing heavy casualties, or we are doing something unachievable, then the soldier cannot fight. So to fight we must be convinced that he is being led properly, the aim is right and that it is achievable, winnable. If the soldier is not convinced of this, then it will have a ripple effect and lead ultimately to loss. That is why I was always against any criticism that would have changed public opinion. It was necessary to keep the morale of the troops high and as well as public confidence and public support high.

What do you think was the turning point in the war against the LTTE. At which point did the tide turn in our favour?

A: We had difficulties initially, but throughout I knew things were working according to our plan and things were on the right track. Once Paranthan was taken I was confident that shortly it would be all over. After Paranthan was taken, Kilinochchi fell, then Elephant Pass, Muhamalai, Mankulam, Oddusudan and Mullaitivu fell within a short period of two weeks. I consider the fall of Paranathan as the real turning point.

What was your approach to international pressure to stop the war. You have been blunt with them, haven't you?

A: When we got to the latter stages, we had many, many military successes and I was so sure we would finish this so I did not want to give any chance for any force to rob these victories from us, so I was very blunt with them and was not going to give in at all. I was not ready to give in at any stage to anything or anybody. I knew that it was the President’s position as well. We knew exactly what to do. Of course there is an important factor here. That is the Indian factor. From the very beginning, from day one, we kept India very well briefed and we prevented any suspicion being created whether it was because of our relationship with China or Pakistan or anybody else. We created a mechanism between India away from the contacts of the Foreign Ministry for us to develop a close relationship mechanism between the officials. Their trio comprised the Indian Foreign Secretary, National Security Adviser and Defense Secretary. On our part we had President’s Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, Basil Rajapaksa and myself. We developed two teams and we were exchanging views and meetings.

We visited India many times, they came here and we discussed many issues which were coming up .We understood the sensitive issues that were coming up closer to the Indian elections .Tamil Nadu was putting pressure. We understood that and did certain things that helped them. Throughout these years we developed this friendship and worked very closely. Whatever other pressures there were, we knew that these friendships will help us overcome that. We knew India's concern is not for the LTTE. They wanted the LTTE to be defeated, but their concern was the Tamil population here. We did many things to prevent civilian casualties and they (India) were very appreciative of the decisions taken in the latter stages such as the one to stop the use of heavy weapons.

You mean the government decision to stop air attacks and use of heavy weaponry was co-related to the Indian elections?

A: No, not the Indian elections. The no-fire-zone and the decision to stop air attacks and use of heavy weapons was a self imposed decision to prevent civilians casualties. It came from us. In the Security Council the President, the Commanders discussed and came out with this idea of a safe zone. India appreciated it. So that was very helpful.

But the decision came soon after two Indian officials met with the President. Was it to help the Congress government at the election in any way?

A: Even before they came, we had decided to do this. Nowhere in the international humanitarian law does it say you have to have a no fire zone, nowhere does it say you cannot use air power or heavy weapons. It only says that where civilians are involved to act responsibly to minimize civilian casualties. Only the Sri Lankan government has done this. These are examples other countries should follow.

There is a lot of speculation about the way the LTTE leadership was killed. What is the final authentic account of their deaths?

A: The LTTE leaders were obviously trying to get away but our plans were fool-proof and they could not get away by land or sea. There is no big story behind it. Tactically, the military cornered them and all the leaders were killed. Our military plans were superior and that’s what happened. There should be no speculation or suspicion.

There is also speculation that Pottu Amman (LTTE Intelligence chief) and Soosai (LTTE Sea Tiger chief) were taken alive and subsequently killed, Can you confirm they are dead?

A: Yes. We found the body of Soosai. We have identified the bodies of all the leaders except Pottu Amman. These areas are marshy land where they were trying to hide. Our soldiers were on a search and destroy operation. And in these circumstances, Pottu Amman’s body could not be identified but there were so many bodies we could not identity. All the people who were there were killed. I am 100 per cent sure that Pottu Amman was also killed in this confrontation.

Were there any last minute attempts by way of an appeal by the LTTE leaders to surrender? There are reports that the political leaders Puleedevan and Nadesan came out carrying white flags and were gunned down?

A: If they wanted to surrender, there were ample opportunities because more than 25,000 surrendered up to the last day. Previously, leaders like Daya Master surrendered. If they wanted to surrender they could have done that.


The final stages of the battle on the beaches of Mullaivaikal
Those who surrendered came and identified themselves as LTTE fighting cadres. Among them were some leaders. They came to the IDP camps. We have taken some into our rehabilitation process and some into custody and are conducting investigations.

If these people could have done that I don’t understand why anybody else could not have done that. If anyone was coming to surrender and we shot them, the people there would have seen it. Nobody came out carrying white flags and was shot at.

They were shot because they were trying to fight, trying to escape or defend themselves. It was in combat – in the fighting that all these people were killed.

What do you feel finally went wrong for the LTTE which was long credited as being a formidable fighting force?

A: Our military was superior, our leadership was superior, our strategy was superior and our soldiers fighting skills were superior. They were well trained and motivated. It was not an easy thing. During this period we lost nearly 6,000 men, mainly from the army. Nearly 2, 500 were permanently disabled.

Overall, if you take all the people who were injured it is nearly 30,000 but of course, some were minor injuries and lot of them have recovered and rejoined their units. That was the intensity of the fighting. It was not an easy thing though we finished it in a short period. It was intense fighting on a continuous basis. Because we increased the military, that gave a lot of flexibility to the Commanders, especially to the army Commander to increase his divisions, to create task forces so troops could be deployed from many directions to counter the LTTE.

We used the navy, air force and the police to hold the areas which were cleared by the army. We put the air force into jungles, we deployed the navy to play a ground role in Trincomalee along the coastal belt. Similarly we deployed many police and civil defence force personnel. We put 4,000 CDF personnel into the Wanni area to hold areas that the troops captured in the latter stages. So the increase of numbers and putting them in roles outside their classic role was important.

In the east, the Karuna factor has been talked about as one that helped the military win there?

A: It would have helped because the absence of Karuna (from the LTTE) helped. That fighting force that was with Karuna was not there for the LTTE but they still had a presence in the area. It is true that they helped us. Karuna, one of the main fighters f the LTTE not being there helped us. They helped in getting certain Intelligence for us .They did not fight with us, though. The fighting was done mainly by the army and the STF in the east.

While the military victory is being celebrated, there is also criticism that it is being used to clamp down on dissenting voices such as the media?

A: I didn’t think that after this victory, there is any journalist writing against it. If that happens, what will happen from the public? The public is 100 per cent with this victory so I don’t think anybody in the media wants to go against this trend with the public.

There is no question of trying to silence anybody because there is nobody talking against this victory, But the President and the government has all the right to get the full benefit of this victory. A military campaign is purely a political decision. Without the President deciding we cannot go on a military campaign. We can advise, but he has to decide. He took the decisions from A to Z and he gave the leadership and it is he who should get the credit. That was the difference in all these 30 years. There was no one to take the decisions.

There was intentional pressure. There was pressure to change the army commander, sometimes to change the Defence Secretary. Even the Opposition Leader said to change the Defence Secretary. With all these, it was the President who had the vision. There was no ambiguity on his apart in all these three years.

Are you concerned about international calls from certain sectors demanding investigations against alleged war crimes?

A: I am not worried because we will not allow such a thing. It was proven at an international forum, when the international community said in one voice that Sri Lanka has defeated the worst terrorist organization in the world and we must commend them on that and not punish them.

The majority of the ‘IC’ (International Community) accepted the fact that the Sri Lankan government did the correct thing. They knew the suffering this country was going through due to terrorism. We don’t have a dictatorship in this country. With all these problems for 30 years, we maintained a democratic system in this country. It is a sovereign nation with a democratically elected government and President. During this period the public showed their support for the President and his policies by endorsing him at the provincial polls. Now it is closed. Nobody should talk about it.

The ‘IC’ has said there should not be any investigation. Anybody who is interested in helping this country should not waste his time talking about investigations. They should support the government to come out of these difficulties and help bring this country to normality.

They should not talk about these investigations and waste our time, waste money and resources because we have no time for that. We have to develop this country. We will not co-operate or accept any of these investigations because there is no reason for that. We were fighting a terrorist organization. We were fighting killers who had killed innocent civilians so there is no necessity for any investigations.

What future role have you envisaged for the military?

A: There are many immediate tasks for the military because security is still a prime concern. Though we have destroyed the LTTE and its leadership, we have to ensure the security of the country so that remnants of the LTTE cannot start this kind of thing, again. There are lots of arms caches in the jungles and we have to find them. Our military is to play a major role in the de-mining process. The protection of our seas is very important. That is a major task for the navy. They have to develop their maritime surveillance system throughout the country.

SUNDAYTIMES.LK