SINHALA AF could not sustain a major ground offensive without air support backed by ‘real time’ intelligence provided by Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(USA)!

First anniversary of Sri Lanka’s victory over LTTE terrorism
How SLAF maximized limited resources

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The SLAF provided the strategic firepower needed by the combined security forces during eelam war IV. Unlike in previous offensives, the SLAF played a pivotal role in the overall campaign causing massive damage to the LTTE first in the East and then in the Vanni and Jaffna theatres. Jets launched from Katunayake air base bombed LTTE training facilities, artillery pieces, and mortar firing positions, underground strong points, Sea Tiger assets and their Muhamalai frontline.

Although the LTTE had hit back hard at the SLAF with a devastating commando raid on Anuradhapura air base followed by an artillery barrage on Vavuniya air base and a series of ‘air attacks’ in the South, the SLAF campaign remained on track. A tri-services court of inquiry revealed negligence on the part of the SLAF at Anuradhapura, though the SLAF responded well to the LTTE assault on its Vavuniya base.

The LTTE, with the support of a section of the media and the so-called international community brought immense pressure on the government to suspend air strikes. Had that happened, the ground offensive would have suffered a severe setback and the LTTE given another opportunity to regroup again.

As the country mark the armed forces’ triumph over the LTTE with week-long celebrations culminating with an unprecedented military parade, including a fly past and sail past, it would be pertinent to discuss the SLAF’s role.

The raid on Anuradhapura could not have come at a worse time. While the 57 Division was struggling on the Vanni front, the Task Force I/58 Division opened a new front in Mannar to push along the coastal road towards Pooneryn. The LTTE struck in the third week of October 2007 a few weeks after the Army opened a front in Mannar. The Anuradhapura raid followed a daring attempt to wipe out the jet squadrons stationed at Katunayake in March 2007. The LTTE strategy had been simple. It planned to cripple the SLAF, deny the air support and then wage an all out ground offensive on equal terms. The armed forces could not sustain a major ground offensive without air support backed by ‘real time’ intelligence provided by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles operating day and night and Beech craft.

The SLAF set the stage for a bloody war by eliminating the international face of the LTTE S. P. Thamilselvan in a daring attack carried out by Kfir and MiG squadrons within two weeks after the LTTE raid on Anuradhapura. There had not been any foot dragging on the part of SLAF top brass. Led by affable Air Chief Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke, the SLAF went all out against the LTTE and did not stop until the battle entered the last stages, thereby preventing air sorties due to nearness of the advancing Army and the LTTE.

The SLAF had acquired a range of new equipment to meet the LTTE threat. The Indian radar as expected had to be accepted along with Indian personnel, while acquisition of Chinese radar, Chinese jets with the capability to fire air-to-air missiles and also shoulder-fired heat seeking missiles bolstered the SLAF. The SLAF’s failure to finish off so-called Air Tigers before they had caused heavy damage, particularly in the last attack in Colombo should not diminish the role played by the SLAF.

The three jet squadrons and the No 9 attack squadron (Mi 24s) had achieved tremendous success. A much larger Air Force would have found it difficult to conduct hundreds of sorties against enemy targets, but the SLAF did an exceptionally fine job in demolishing the LTTE.

The No 9 attack squadron went to the extent of landing behind the enemy lines to evacuate Army personnel returning from special missions.

The SLAF moved both men and material to the Jaffna peninsula under difficult conditions. Since the loss of the overland route to the peninsula in 1990 (eelam war II), the SLAF and the Navy had been entrusted with the task of moving supplies and facilitating the movement of personnel to and from Palaly.

The SLAF also played an important role in operations against Sea Tigers. The jet squadrons and No 9 attack squadron targeted Sea Tigers on numerous occasions, in some instances on information provided by the Navy. In fact of the eight floating LTTE arsenals, destroyed by the Navy the first was targeted jointly by the Navy and the SLAF east off Kalmunai point in September 2006. The Navy had engaged the LTTE vessel after jets bombed it.

The SLAF had an opportunity to improvise its strategy and cleverly use resources at its disposal to cause maximum possible damage on the LTTE. Although Kfirs and MiG 27 had been in service with the SLAF since 1996 and 2000, respectively, the LTTE did not experience the brunt of their power. Eelam war IV saw, jet squadrons and No 9 attack squadron taking the war to the LTTE and systematically destroying their will to fight.

During the eelam war IV, SLAF personnel operated with ground forces to help field commanders obtain ‘real time’ aerial intelligence of enemy movements and direct artillery and mortar fire and in some instances call for air strikes. As the final battle on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon approached, the SLAF had two jets stationed at China Bay to meet any eventuality. Had the LTTE made a bid to evacuate top LTTE leaders by sea, jets could have joined the action. But the Army and the SLN never allowed the LTTE an opportunity at least to make an abortive bid. The rest is history.

(Tomorrow: Lanka can still benefit from ‘war-time foreign policy’)


www island.lk