The story of Sri Lanka would have been similar to Cyprus if Prabaharan had allied with India, cooperated with IPKF & formed the N-E Provincial Govt.!!

JVP should revisit its stand on the national question - Somawansa: Inspired challenge or accidental remark?
February 19, 2011, 4:02 pm


Kumar David



The most significant event at the opening session of the JVP’s Sixth Congress on 10 February was Somawansa’s reference to federalism. To be absolutely fair - I was present at the ceremony - let me report the incident precisely. Previously the delegate of a left party from Cyprus described their strategy in that unhappily divided island which was a stand for a united Cyprus on the basis of a federal system; that is federalism for the Greek and Turkish communities in a reunited country. Somawansa’s was a wrap-up talk thanking the invited delegates, but one matter he singled out for special comment was the Cypriot’s remarks. He was speaking in Sinhala and a fair translation would be as follows: "There are two types of federalism; that which encourages separation and that which promotes unity. We salute you and we strongly support you in your efforts to have a federal system for the purpose of uniting your country".



This was a no passing remark



There is no question; this was no passing remark confined to Cyprus, something more is cooking. There was no reason to single out the Cypriot’s statement and make comments that can clearly be read the way I am reading them here. Not only did I raise my eyebrows but I looked around and noticed many others too had picked up their ears; a lady next to me leaned over: "This is significant and I am glad he made the distinction". The assembled JVP delegates clapped and I think most realised that a new concept has been injected into the discourse. The role of a leader is to lead, to push the party forward to new ideas when the time is ripe and I hope this is what Somawansa was intending to do. Was he challenging his party to move forward or was it a trivial remark? We have to wait and see.



Am I reading too much into the incident? Well yes it is possible, this was only the ceremonial part; the closed sessions of the party conference, the real meat of the day was starting in the afternoon. Did the JVP Congress revisit the national question and take a fresh look? I may be attributing too much significance to the incident because, subjectively, I am keen to see the change. If the strongest left party in the country, fighting against autocracy, is moving forward on the national question as well, it is a matter of great importance.



There will be an internal struggle and it will proceed at two levels, the tactical and the strategic. The former will revolve around concern that while the JVP will not pick up Tamil votes by adopting a new position it will lose Sinhalese support. The strategic issue concerns the basic position of a party which calls itself left, revolutionary, Marxist and internationalist, on the national question. Or in practical rather than ideological language: What is the JVP’s formula for national integration and solving the Tamil question?



Tamils are unlikely to vote for the JVP in large numbers unless it reaches an understanding with Tamil political parties to facilitate tactical voting in some electorates in putative constituency based electorates of the future. The JVP has only itself to blame for alienating the Tamil community by the way it behaved throughout the war. Its anti-LTTE venom showed no sympathy for the underlying oppression that created the LTTE in the first place. Its lexicon was obsessed with words like "terrorist" and alongside Gotabhaya it was the principal cheerleader for the racist war. To this day the JVP will not countenance any inquiry into war crimes. It refuses to vote against the Emergency in parliament and it is these Emergency Laws that keep thousands of Tamil youth illegally incarcerated without charge or trial. In short, the Tamils can find little comfort in JVP politics thus far.



A majority of Tamils are unlikely to vote for the JVP for another reason as well, as they did not for the LSSP in the post-independence decade. The Tamil community has a narrow outlook and blinkered mindset originating in social and ideological antecedents, but it would take too long to discuss this topic in any depth today. The point is that the part of the tactical objection concerning the shortfall of Tamil votes for the JVP is correct.



The other portion of the tactical argument is not correct. The core Sinhalese vote that the JVP draws will not desert it if it goes forward to enunciate a principled position on the national question. The JVP is not a racist entity and has not gone around slaughtering Tamils as the SLFP and UNP habitually do. It has however played the chauvinist card in the hope of gaining votes, but the tactic has backfired. Despite a bloodcurdling anti-LTTE campaign it has been left empty handed by Rajapaksa’s war victory and its cadres are bewildered by the outcome. The truth is that supporting devolution will not erode the party’s Sinhalese base; racist sections of the electorate will not support a left party in any case.



However, there is work to be done if the JVP is to make a shift on the national question. It will have to undertake a massive education and consciousness building exercise starting with its own cadres. This certainly can be done since these cadres are the cream of the politically conscious mass Sinhala youth and intelligentsia. Furthermore, the benefits which will flow to society at large from such an effort will go beyond the confines of the party boundary.



The JVP and the national question



The deeper strategic question is the JVP’s concept of a nation state. Although Marxist in name, the JVP will have nothing to do with self-determination and the right to secession for minority nations. Forget it, let that matter blow over; I am not going to quarrel about it here as it serves no practical purpose at this time. But why not self-administration in Tamil areas, why not devolution to distinct communities, why not autonomy, and for that matter why not federalism? What blocks the JVP from moving forward at this level?



The roadblock at this level is the JVP’s own history, its ingrained habit of opposing devolution. It has caught a tiger by the tail and does not know how to let go. It was a bitter opponent of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the Thirteenth Amendment, and linking the North-East. This habit hangs heavy, the past weighs down like a colossal ball and chain on the present.



How is the JVP to explain this past to the nation and to its own cadre if it now accepts devolution of power? It knows perfectly well that if the nation state in Lanka is to be unified it must be on the basis of power sharing between communities; but how to escape from its blunder of excessive Sinhala nationalism in the past? It is not the national question per se but this tangential conundrum that will shackle the JVP if it attempts a review of fundamentals.



In the prison years and the period prior to the 1982 presidential elections the JVP did move to a Marxist position; it even tentatively accepted self-determination. The leadership will have to revisit this period and open up this history for internal discussion if it is serious about addressing the national question afresh. We have to wait and see if the leadership has the intention and stamina to take up these fundamental questions.



There is also cynicism in the media that the JVP is simply biding its time till the government makes concessions to the Tamils, awaiting an opportunity to unleash a deluge of communalism. I think these prophets of gloom are wrong, but it is up to the JVP to prove it by making a clear declaration debunking these doubts and suspicions.



Cyprus and Sri Lanka



The story of Sri Lanka would have been similar to Cyprus if Prabaharan had allied with India, cooperated with the IPKF and formed the N-E Provincial Government in 1987. Thereafter the Thamil Eelam strategy would have been to consolidate separatism with Indian protection. Not for the first time, nor the last, he blew it and therefore the political history of the two islands is different.



Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 but the Muslim Turks (18%) felt unfairly treated by the majority Christian Greeks (77%) and started governing themselves with a degree of self-asserted autonomy from 1964 onwards. Trust the colonels to screw things up! After the Greek military coup in 1967, the colonels in Athens attempted, in 1974, to overthrow Archbishop Makarios using military units in Nicosia. They were angered that Makarios was sporting a degree of independence from their jackboot. The attempt not only failed and led to the demise of the military junta in Greece, but it also triggered a Turkish invasion of the island. For the last 36 years Cyprus has been home to two physically separate self-governing entities; the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the south has international recognition thanks to continuity with a pre-invasion past while the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish Eelam!) is recognised only by Turkey. Both sides have agreed to reunification on a federal basis but negotiations always break down on specifics. The minority Turkish north wants a great deal of sovereignty approaching confederation, the majority Greek south prefers a strong central government. Hopes of agreement are getting nowhere.



Somawansa has spoken of two types of federalism; that which promotes unity and that which produces separation. The real lesson of Cyprus is the third version which he failed to mention; federalism that forestalls division. Had the Greek Cypriot majority, uninterrupted by thick-headed Greek mainland military brass, offered the Turkish community the right to manage its affairs in the areas of its majority domicile, the rapture of Cyprus could have been forestalled. The JVP now has an opportunity to learn from this idiocy.

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