That Famliar Impasse....!

That Familiar Impasse.....by Tisaranee Gunasekara


The news from Tamilnadu invokes worrying memories of avoidable mistakes, fatal turning points and burnt bridges. In a move hailed by Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi as ‘an impetus for India to act’ and ‘a warning to Colombo’ the DMK led All Parties Conference gave Delhi a two week ultimatum: halt military assistance to Colombo, stop the war and help the displaced Tamils or 39 parliamentarians from the eight signatory parties will resign, en masse.

Manmohan Singh’s reluctance to get involved in another Lankan adventure is understandable and indeed wise. This, after all, is the same LTTE which broke a solemn undertaking to India, waged war on her and assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. Unfortunately a ‘hands off’ policy, however sensible, may not be viable much longer, given the developments in Tamilnadu. According to a survey done by the reputed ‘Indian Express’, there is widespread support for both Lankan Tamils and the LTTE in Tamilnadu. The DMK had to take a stand on Sri Lanka because it did not want AIADMK to benefit from this public mood; similarly the Congress Party may be compelled to harden its own stance, in order survive in power and to win the next election.

How will Delhi react to the ultimatum from Tamilnadu? Will it try to buy time by sending a high-powered delegation to deliver a message urging restraint? Or will it opt for a more forceful response such as another ‘aid offensive’ to deliver humanitarian assistance to the displaced Tamils? Will the Indian navy be deployed to ‘protect’ Tamilnadu fishermen from attacks or even to ‘temporarily’ occupy Katchativu? Though the Congress administration may not want to get too embroiled Lankan affairs again, ultimately the nature of Indian response would be shaped by the mood in Tamilnadu which in turn will be influenced by events in Sri Lanka. If there is an increase in civilian casualties or more attacks on Indian fishermen, the mood in Tamilnadu will go from very bad to infinitely worse and Delhi will have no choice but to respond with less equivocation and more force.



Tamilnadu and Delhi

It is necessary to understand that a serious problem exists, which cannot be shouted down or wished away. It will not be possible to pacify Delhi with some empty promise as the Rajapakse administration is wont to do. Yelling anti-Indian slogans from rooftops or burning effigies of Messers Karunanidhi and Manmohan Singh outside the Indian High Commission will not work either. Sri Lanka cannot resist India without internal unity. As President Premadasa understood, the only we way can realistically face up to India is if we have the Tamils on our side. Currently the antithetical situation obtains. By failing to draw a clear line of demarcation between Tamils and Tigers and by allowing the necessary war against the LTTE to degenerate into a war to re-impose Sinhala dominance over Tamils via a Pax Sinhala, the Rajapakse administration has enabled Tamilnadu and India to pose as champions of Lankan Tamils. India may wish to impose her dominance on Sri Lanka; but even an exercise in regional hegemonism can be made to seem kosher internationally, if depicted as a protective measure on behalf of Lankan Tamils. Such a situation can be prevented only if we reach out to the Tamils, via greater concern for their wellbeing and a political solution to the ethnic problem.

The unfortunate truth is that in the eyes of most of the world Sri Lanka will not figure either as a Cuba or even a Venezuela. Deservedly or undeservedly we will not be seen as a brave little country facing the might of a giant neighbour, but a state that is trying use a war against terrorism to subdue its minorities and make them accept majoritarian rule. If there is any David in this tale, it will be those civilian Tamils, caught between a barbaric LTTE and a ruthless Rajapakse administration, their plight symbolised by a stark black and white picture of a malnourished child refugee holding a baby in an even worse condition, both of them weeping in terror (published by the BBC on Sep 23rd). Thus, internationally, parallels will be drawn not between Sri Lanka and Cuba or Venezuela but between Sri Lanka and Serbia or Georgia. Given this context we will not be seen as occupying the moral or political high-ground and therefore our chances of finding international support beyond Pakistan and China would be miniscule.



The Stakes

At this juncture it is important to remember that there was no stir in Tamilnadu during either the Second or the Third Eelam Wars, not even when Jaffna fell. In fact until the Sinhala supremacist tendencies of the Rajapakse administration became obvious, both Delhi and Tamilnadu were anti-LTTE and the Congress government was willing to openly aid Sri Lanka against the Tigers. Unfortunately the President committed himself to a unitary state, rejected the homeland principle, permitted the judicial de-merger of the North-East, denied the very existence of an ethnic problem (thereby obviating the need for devolution) and made a mockery of the APC. The obnoxiously Sinhala supremacist deeds and words of the Defence Secretary and the Army Commander, the supposed attacks on Tamilnadu fishermen by the Lankan Navy, the disturbing lack of sympathy towards the plight of civilian Tamils, the gross mishandling of incidents such as the Vallipunam air raid – these were important landmarks in our road back to 1987.

Economically too we are rapidly entering a breaking point. Sri Lanka has been identified by the World Bank as one of 28 ‘fiscally vulnerable’ countries with little or no debt headroom. If we continue to borrow from private foreign currency markets a debt trap may be unavoidable. Unfortunately the Rajapakses, happily immersed in their favourite delusions, are in no mood to heed warning cries or to take remedial measures. This is obvious from the Presidential directive not to permit the EU investigate Sri Lanka’s compliance with three international conventions (on Human and Political Rights, against Torture and on Child Rights) as a precondition for the extension of the GSP+ facility. Instead he had directed the government to find alternate markets in Latin America and the Middle East – another utterly unrealistic goal, particularly at a time of global recession. Despite the military successes, the Rajapakse way has led the country to a precipice, politically and economically, the same precipice we reached during the second term of President Jayewardene.

The time has come to get our priorities right. We need to prevent the division of Sri Lanka but we must understand that devolution (including full federalism) does not amount to division. We need to defeat the LTTE (as long as Vellupillai Pirapaharan is alive the Tigers will not give up Eelam) but we should not pick fights with non-Tiger actors and entities simply because they back devolution or champion human rights. We must defend our sovereignty but it can be done while adhering to internationally accepted norms on minority and child rights. The war can coexist with a political solution to the ethnic problem, with greater concern for human rights and with increased cooperation with India, the West, the UN and reputed INGOs. In fact the war will be sustainable only if it is waged within those parameters.

The government needs to make a course correction but can it do so, given the symbiotic connection between President Rajapakse and the Sinhala supremacists? Can the President, without endangering his very survival, muzzle the Army Commander, restrain the Defence Secretary, neutralise the JHU, and other assorted Sinhala hardliners, allow adequate humanitarian assistance to get through to the war displaced, soften the stance on human rights and come up with a political solution ideally based on the Indian model?

The latest historically inaccurate and racially bigoted outpourings of Minister Champika Ranawaka indicate the impossibility of the task: "The Sinhalese are the only organic race of Sri Lanka. Other communities are all visitors to the country, whose arrival was never challenged out of the compassion of Buddhists. But they must not take this compassion for granted. The Muslims are here because our kings let them trade here and the Tamils because they were allowed to take refuge when the Moguls were invading them in India. What is happening today is pure ingratitude on the part of these visitors" (Daily Mirror – 16.10.2008).

Mahinda Rajapakse is facing the same conundrum his politico-spiritual ancestor SWRD Bandaranaike encountered half a century ago. Mr. Bandaranaike used the forces of Sinhala extremism in order to come to power and stay in power and ended up by being consumed by them. The same fate may befall President Rajapakse if he tries to restrain the lunatic fringe which occupies such a central position in his administration and within his own inner circle.



The Killing of Janaka Perera

Maj. Gen. Janaka Perera was killed by the LTTE. The Tiger’s work was made easier by the regime’s persistent refusal to provide some security to the retired General turned politician. The killing of Janaka Perera by the LTTE proves that the defence establishment acted either with criminal inanity or with shocking malice when it turned down his repeated requests for protection. Since the defence establishment claimed that according to ‘intelligence reports’ there was no risk to Gen. Perera’s life, his murder compels one of two conclusions: either the intelligence officials who compiled the aforementioned ‘reports’ were criminally unintelligent; or the defence authorities lied about the very existence of such reports.

In the interests of national security there should be a parliamentary inquiry as to which is the correct conclusion. If there were intelligence reports stating that Janaka Perera was not under any Tiger threat, it is imperative to find out who prepared them; the authors of any such dangerously stupid report must be removed from the vital task of intelligence gathering and analysis immediately, in public interest. On the other hand if no such reports existed and the defence authorities denied security to Gen. Perera on a whim or as an act of vengeance, that too should be revealed to the country and the culprits punished.

Some may argue that Gen. Perera forfeited the right to security when he entered the political field. But the same cannot be said of Gen. Parakrama Pannipitiya, a serving officer who was forced to seek legal redress when his security was withdrawn arbitrarily (reportedly because he fell foul of the Army Commander). So the criterion in providing state protection is not whether one is pro or anti-LTTE but whether one is pro or anti-government. If one is with the government, one is a patriot by definition.

Two key participants in the Wickremesinghe appeasement process, GL Peiris and Milinda Moragoda, became patriots by the simple expedient of changing sides and backing the Rajapakses. A retired general and a serving general did not qualify as patriots as they were not in the good books of the powers that be. What the regime is demanding, in the name of patriotism, is unquestioning obedience and unconditional support. This is neither possible nor desirable in a modern democracy, especially when a regime is remarkably short-sighted and prone to self-made disasters. The Rajapakse administration has brought the country to an avoidable impasse through its inability to comprehend that wars are not decided on battlefields alone and in this globalised world there are no economic or political islands; giving it a blank cheque can only worsen Sri Lanka’s woes.


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